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Abstract
Background: User fees have been shown to constitute a major barrier to the utilisation of health-care, particularly
in low-income countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Importantly, such barriers can lead to
the exclusion of vulnerable individuals from health-care. In 2008, a donor-funded primary health-care programme
began implementing user fee subsidisation in 20 health zones of the DRC. In this study, we quantified the short
and long-term effects of this policy on health-care utilisation.
Methods: Sixteen health zones were included for analysis. Using routinely collected health-care utilisation data
before and after policy implementation, interrupted time series regression was applied to quantify the temporal
impact of the user fee policy in the studied health zones. Payment of salary supplements to health-care workers
and provision of free drugs - the other components of the programme - were controlled for where possible.
Results: Fourteen (88%) health zones showed an immediate positive effect in health-care utilisation rates (overall
median increase of 19%, interquartile range 11 to 43) one month after the policy was introduced, and the effect
was significant in seven zones (P <0.05). This initial effect was sustained or increased at 24 months in five health
zones but was only significant in one health zone at P <0.05. Utilisation reduced over time in the remaining health
zones (overall median increase of 4%, interquartile range −10 to 33). The modelled mean health-care utilisation rate
initially increased significantly from 43 consultations/1000 population to 51 consultations/1000 population during
the first month following implementation (P <0.01). However, the on-going effect was not significant (P =0.69).
Conclusions: Our research brings mixed findings on the effectiveness of user fee subsidisation as a strategy to
increase the utilisation of services. Future work should focus on feasibility issues associated with the removal or
reduction of user fees and how to sustain its effects on utilisation in the longer term.
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Background
User fees, defined as out-of-pocket payments by patients
for medical services in health facilities, were introduced
in many African countries as a response to deteriorating
primary health-care systems and a decline in both donor
and government expenditure on health during the global
economic crisis of the 1980s [1]. This was supported
both by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
and the World Health Organization through the Bamako
Initiative [2], which aimed to secure the continuation of
the delivery of basic services through generating funds
from communities by charging drugs at a mark-up cost.
The additional funds generated through this mark-up could
then be used by the community to establish a revolving
drug fund and finance other primary health-care services
in combination with government and donor funding. The
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initiative also sought to improve accountability between
providers and communities, as well as provide a sus-
tainable way of improving access to health facilities,
health-care utilisation and quality of care, while lowering
frivolous use of health services [3,1].
However, the implementation of debt relief initiatives
for developing countries [4], reinvestment of donors in
the health sector, strong economic growth, and the
Millennium Development Goals have created a new
context. Once seen as a solution, user fees are growingly
seen as part of the problem. Ponsar et al. [5] showed
that user fees in several African countries may present
significant barriers for accessing health-care and can
result in the exclusion of vulnerable individuals. They
suggested a mechanism of user fee abolition combined
with compensation of health facilities for the lost revenue.
User fee subsidisation – whereby the running cost of
services (which covers fuel for generators, disinfectant
products, and medical supplies) is subsidised by a donor
and/or government thus resulting in a lower fee to the
user - may be an expedient approach towards achieving
such abolition, particularly for vulnerable groups.
Yet there is still an ongoing debate regarding user fees
in the literature. Evidence has shown that introducing or
increasing user fees can result in a decrease in the use of
both preventative and curative health-care services [6],
while abolishing user fees can lead to an overall increase
in health-care utilisation rates [7]. However, it should
also be recognised that failure to support the supply-side
of health-care may constrain the value of user fee removal
[8,9]. In areas where user fees have been reduced or
abolished, the resultant increase in health-care utilisa-
tion can negatively affect staff morale because of the
increased workload and reduced revenue [10,11]. In
addition, although the evidence is limited, the abolishment
of user fees has sometimes been accompanied by an
increase in the number of reports of informal payments
being made to health workers [12]. These findings illus-
trate the importance of monitoring the implementation
of policies targeting user fees.
To date, qualitative studies on patients’ perceptions of
user fees have been previously conducted in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [5] but there have been no
quantitative studies on user fee subsidisation in this con-
text. This study aimed to address this gap by answering the
following research question: what are the effects on health-
care utilisation of a policy to subsidise user fees in the
DRC? Specific objectives included assessing the short-and
long-term effects of user fee subsidisation on health-care
utilisation in a) individual health zones and b) for the entire
sample population. It is hoped that the findings of this
study will contribute to discussions on whether user fees
should be subsidised through third party subsidisation in
the DRC and other low-income countries [13].
Background
The DRC
The DRC has faced decades of conflict and instability
which continues to impact on its health system. Health
services rely on a system of cost recovery through user
fees, as government financing of the health sector is very
limited [14]. Yet, according to the 2011 Human Develop-
ment Index, the DRC is the poorest country in the world
[15]. It has the lowest Gross Domestic Product per capita
in the world with 60% of its population living on less than
$1.25 per day [16]. In such a context, user fees would likely
constitute a major barrier for accessing health services.
The country also has catastrophic health indicators, and
child and maternal mortality rates are respectively the
second and fourth highest in the world [17,18]. Utilisation
of health services is extremely low; on average one person
consults health services every 6.7 years [19].
The DRC government published its Health Systems
Strengthening Strategy in 2006 [20], which recognised
the poor budgetary allocation to health and the weak
execution of these funds. The strategy proposed different
options for improving the health financing system such
as increasing the mobilisation of public sector resources,
use of community health insurance schemes and also
user fee subsidisation. The DRC Ministry of Health even
has a policy to reduce or abolish fees for some “vulnerable
groups” such as sexual violence survivors, indigents and
the elderly, and supports the abolishment of user fees
during emergency periods in conflict zones, but this is
variably enforced.
Access to health-care programme
Between 2008 and 2012, two non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) - the International Rescue Committee (IRC)
and Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN) -
implemented the Access to Health-Care Programme in the
DRC which was funded by the Department of International
Development (DFID) [21]. The programme covered a total
of 20 health zones and was located in four provinces –
Province Orientale, Maniema, Kasai Occidental, and South
Kivu, the latter of which has been affected by devastating
conflict since the second Congo war, which occurred be-
tween 1998 and 2003 [22]. Each health zone is similar to a
“health district” in other areas of Africa; it is a well-defined
geographical area comprising a referral hospital and satel-
lite health centres serving a population of approximately
120,000 people.
The Access to Health-Care Programme supported pub-
lic primary health-care centres and hospitals situated in
these health zones to provide a package of primary health-
care services, covering a total population of approximately
two and a half million inhabitants. The support included
financing of: day-to-day running costs, construction and
rehabilitation of facilities, medical equipment, training of
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health workers, drugs, and salary supplements for health
workers. The cost per capita per year (which included
NGO costs) was estimated to be $13.9.
Fixed amounts of money were paid by the NGOs to
health facilities each month for their running costs. For
health centres, the average amount was $40 per month,
while $1500 was given to hospitals, yielding a cost per
capita per year of $0.20. Given the general disrepair of
many facilities, health facilities were constructed or reha-
bilitated where necessary. In order to improve the capacity
of health personnel, the NGOs provided clinical, manage-
ment, monitoring, evaluation and community health
training throughout the programme. Including equipment
and NGO costs, this resulted in a high cost per capita per
year of approximately $10.15.
In terms of drug provision, the NGOs operated a
“pull” system; health zones placed orders with the NGOs
which were based on average monthly drug consumption
calculations. The amount spent by NGOs on drugs was
estimated to be $1.5 per capita per year, which included
transportation costs. Staff were discouraged from over-
reporting drug consumption as regular and random
supervisory drug checks were conducted by the NGOs on
a monthly basis. Another deterrent to over-reporting was
that several registers would need to be changed in order
to record the distribution of drugs; these included the
patient register, dispensing register and drug report.
Frequent audits of the drug management systems were
undertaken in order to verify that these registers were
consistent with one another.
With respect to salary supplements, seventy percent of
the salary supplement was provided to workers each
month based on their attendance at health facilities,
while the remaining thirty percent was dependent on
attaining a minimum score at the quarterly performance
review of the health facility. The amount allocated to
each health zone per month also varied according to the
number of health facilities and number and grades of
health workers; the average cost per capita per year was
approximately $2.05.
Drug provision, salary supplements, and the financing
of running costs in order to subsidise user fees were
introduced progressively at different times in health zones,
with all interventions in place in all health zones by
October 2010 (see Table 1). In general, free provision of
drugs either preceded the introduction of salary supple-
ments or occurred simultaneously, while the financing
of running costs occurred some months thereafter. Only
once the running costs were financed were the user fees
then lowered. Financing of all of these costs by DFID
enabled all primary health-care services to be provided
free of charge (i.e. fully subsidised) for vulnerable groups
which included: pregnant women, children under five
years of age, survivors of sexual violence, and indigents. It
also allowed services to be provided at a substantially
reduced cost (i.e. partially subsidised) of 30 cents for
the rest of the population. Prior to the programme, the
cost for a consultation was just over $5, equivalent to
the average weekly wage, with additional charges for drugs,
tests and procedures. No other donor-funded health
systems strengthening programmes were known to be
operating within the health zones specified above during
the Access to health-care programme.
Method
Design
This was a “before and after” study assessing the effects
of user fee subsidisation on health-care utilisation.
Data collection
All patients attending public primary health-care facilities
supported by the Access to Health-Care Programme were
included in this study. Data on the number of primary
health-care consultations were extracted from the national
routine health information system, known as the Système
National d’Informations Sanitaires, for each month be-
tween January 2008 and December 2012, by health zone.
For all zones, data on health-care utilisation were cross-
checked against health facility registers on a bi-annual basis
between 2008 and 2012, in order to confirm that reporting
was accurate. Spot checks in all health zones were also con-
ducted on a quarterly basis for a small number of indicators
selected at random; these indicators were either the overall
utilisation rate, the number of malaria consultations, the
number of assisted births, or the number of vaccinations.
Similar to the bi-annual checks, data on the routine health
information system were cross-checked against registers
held at the facility.
All health zones had at least 12 months of data prior
to the introduction of user fee subsidies. Seven out of 16
health zones had at least three or more data points prior
to the introduction of drugs and salary supplements.
Data analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using the software
“R”, version 3.0. The main outcome measure was the
health-care utilisation rate per 1000 population (the
number of monthly consultations divided by the annual
population for each health zone multiplied by 1000). Pop-
ulation denominators within health zones were extrapo-
lated from the 1984 census (the most recent available)
[23], with population growth assumed to be 2.7% per
annum [24]. Although this source of data is thirty years
out of date, it continues to be used by the Ministry of
Health in all health information data calculations. Subse-
quent census data for health zones have been collected
during vaccination campaigns but have never been vali-
dated and so were not used.
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For each of the health zones, interrupted time series
regression analysis was used to adjust for structural
trends and potential serial correlation of the data, as
described in detail by Lagarde [25]. In order to aggregate
the data and understand the overall effect of subsidies
on utilisation, all monthly data points for each health
zone 12 months prior to the introduction of user fee
subsidies and 24 months following the introduction of
user fee subsidies were compiled and the mean utilisation
rate at each of these time points calculated.
Two econometric models were used; one included
dummy variables for salary supplements and drugs, and
the other did not. For the nine health zones where there
were no data points prior to the introduction of drugs and
salary supplements (see Table 1), equation 1 was used:
Yt ¼ βo þ β1  time þ β2  subsidies
þ β3  postslope þ εt
ð1Þ
In this equation, Yt represents health-care utilisation at
time t, where t is a continuous variable indicating time
in months which is coded sequentially from 0 from the
start of the programme until the end of the programme.
User fee subsidies are coded 0 prior to the intervention
and then 1 for all post-intervention time points. The
postslope is also coded 0 for time points prior to the
intervention, and then coded sequentially from 1 when
the intervention is introduced. βo represents the constant
which captures the baseline level of the outcome at
time 0, while β1 estimates the structural trend of the
data and is independent of the intervention. β2 esti-
mates the immediate impact of the intervention and β3
estimates the change in trend after the intervention is
introduced. This equation was also used to measure the
aggregate effect of subsidies, using the mean utilisation
rate across all health zones.
Essentially, the difference before and after the intro-
duction of user fee subsidisation was quantified by test-
ing the change in the level (β2) and the slope (β3) of the
regression. A change in level between the pre- and post-
intervention segments indicated an immediate (short-
term) effect, and a change in slope indicated a change in
trend and therefore on-going (long-term) effect.
Drugs and salary supplements were included as dummy
variables in the interrupted time series analysis model for
the seven zones in which data points prior to their intro-
duction were available (see Table 1). The aim was to adjust
for the effects of these potential confounding factors in
Table 1 Timing of interventions in each of the health zones
Province Health zone Drug supply for
free by the project
to the health centres
Salary supplement
paid to the staff
Subsidisation of
running costs and
userfee subsidisation
(full and partial)
First month of
the data set
Last month of
the dataset
Regression
equation
Kasai Occidental Demba 01/04/2008 01/04/2008 01/04/2009 January 2009 December 2012 1
South Kivu Itombwe 01/04/2008 01/04/2008 01/09/2010 January 2009 December 2012 1
Maniema Kailo 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2009 December 2012 1
South Kivu Kabare 01/04/2008 01/04/2008 01/09/2010 January 2009 December 2012 1
Maniema Kampene 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2009 December 2012 1
South Kivu Minembwe 01/04/2008 01/04/2008 01/09/2010 January 2009 December 2012 1
Maniema Pangi 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2009 December 2012 1
South Kivu Kalehe 01/04/2008 01/04/2008 01/08/2010 January 2009 December 2012 1
Province
Orientale
Ubundu 01/04/2008 01/04/2008 01/04/2009 March 2008 December 2012 1
Maniema Punia 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2008 December 2012 2
Maniema Ferekeni 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2008 December 2012 2
Maniema Kalima 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2008 December 2012 2
Maniema Lubutu 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2008 December 2012 2
Maniema Obokote 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2010 January 2008 December 2012 2
Province
Orientale
Banalia 01/10/2008 01/10/2008 01/04/2009 March 2008 December 2012 3
Province
Orientale
Bengamisa 01/10/2008 01/10/2008 01/04/2009 March 2008 December 2012 3
N.B For health zones Alunguli, Kindu, Lukonga and Mutoto, data included consultations at private facilities or the times at which salary supplements or free drug
provision were introduced were not known. As a result, these zones were not analysed in the study. The remaining 16 health zones had less than 10% of data
missing. All health zones in the table above had 12 months data prior to user fee subsidisation. The last seven zones had at least three or more data points prior
to the introduction of drugs and salary supplements.
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those zones. Where drugs and salary supplements were
introduced at the same time, equation 2 was used:
Yt ¼ βo þ β1  time þ β2  salary supplements
and drugs þ β3  subsidies þ β4  postslope
salarysupplements and drugs þ β5  postslope
subsidies þ εt
ð2Þ
In this equation, similar to user fee subsidies, salary
supplements and drugs are coded 0 prior to their intro-
duction and then 1 for all post-intervention time points.
Postslope salary supplements and drugs is also coded 0 for
time points prior to their implementation, and then coded
sequentially from 1 when they have been introduced.
Where drugs and salary supplements were introduced
at different times, equation 3 was employed:
Yt ¼ βo þ β1  time þ β2  drugs þ β3
 salary supplements þ β4  subsidies þ β5
 postslopesalary supplements þ β6  postslope
drugs þ β7  postslope subsidies þ εt
ð3Þ
As in equation two, salary supplements and drugs are
coded 0 prior to their introduction and then 1 following
their implementation. Postslope drugs and postslope sal-
ary supplements are also coded 0 for time points prior
to their introduction, and then coded sequentially from
1 following their introduction.
For each regression model, autocorrelation of the data
was detected using the Durbin-Watson test and corrected
using general least squares regression [25,6].
A Student’s t-test was used to assess whether the
provision of drugs or salary supplements significantly
altered the effect of user fee subsidisation on health-
care utilisation rates. Specifically, the test examined for
differences in the mean user fee subsidisation coefficients
(both the level and the slope coefficients) between zones
according to their drugs and salary supplements status.
The coefficients for user fee subsidisation (level and
slope) obtained from the interrupted time series regres-
sion analyses were also used to model outcomes at one
and 24 months after the introduction of subsidisation, and
compared to counterfactual outcomes (i.e. the projected
outcomes in the absence of an intervention) as described
previously by Lagarde et al. [7]. For example, if by month
24 of data collection the intervention has been in place for
12 months, the expected utilisation rate can be calculated
by imputing the values of the explanatory variables into
the estimated regression equation as follows:
Y^24 mð Þ ¼ βo þ β1  24 þ β2  1 þ β3  13
The counterfactual outcome is obtained using the fol-
lowing equation:
Y^24 cð Þ ¼ βo þ β1  24
The difference between these outcomes can then be
calculated to obtain a relative percentage change:
Φ ¼ Y^24 mð Þ ‐ Y^24 cð Þ
 
=Y^24 cð Þ
Ethical approval
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Kinshasa School of Public Health (Kinshasa, DRC).
Results
First, we will present some descriptions on the trend
of utilisation rates in individual health zones. Then we
will detail the significance of the coefficients for the
short- and long-term effects of subsidies on utilisation
at the health zone level, and at the aggregate level.
Eventually, we report the relative percentage changes
in utilisation at 1 month and 24 months at the health
zone level.
Trends of utilisation rates: individual and aggregate level
In all health zones, utilisation rates were higher by the
end of the programme compared to the start of the
programme. The health zone Banalia demonstrated the
most change during the programme, with utilisation
rates starting at 5 consultations/month/1000 population
and ending at 63 consultations/month/1000 population.
However, Kabare health zone demonstrated the least
change overall during the course of the programme, with
utilisation rates starting from 60 consultations/month/
1000 population in 2008 and ending with only 65 con-
sultations/month/1000 population by the end of the
programme. With respect to the aggregate data, the
mean utilisation rate increased from 38 consultations/
month/1000 population in 2008 to 69 consultations/
month/1000 population after 12 months of the policy.
Short- and long-term effects of user fee subsidisation on
health-care utilisation: Individual health zones and at
aggregate level
Figure 1 is an example of the results observed in one
health zone, and also illustrates the difference between
the change in utilisation after one month and 24 months
of user fee subsidisation. Similar analyses were performed
for the remaining 15 health zones (see Table 1 for infor-
mation on the equations used for each zone and Tables 2
and 3 for regression outputs). Seven out of the 16 health
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zones showed significant positive coefficients for change
in level subsidies β2 at P <0.05 (short-term effect), while
only Obokote health zone showed a significant positive
coefficient for the change in slope subsidies (long-term
effect) β3 at P <0.05.
Only in Kalima health zone did the introduction of
drugs appear to have a significant short-term effect on
utilisation (change in levels drugs β2 at P <0.01). However,
no statistical difference at the P <0.05 level was detected
between mean user fee subsidisation coefficients (mean
change in level subsidies β2 and mean change in slope
subsidies β3) obtained from zones which included salary
supplements and drugs in the regression model, compared
to those which did not. This seems to indicate that the
timing of the provision of drugs and salary supplements
did not significantly alter the effect of user fee subsidisa-
tion on health-care utilisation.
For the effect at the aggregate level, the mean health-
care utilisation rate of the 16 health zones was calculated
12 months prior to and 24 months following the intro-
duction of user fee subsidisation (see Figure 2 below and
the regression output in Table 4). There was an immediate
increase in the mean health-care utilisation rate once
subsidisation was introduced and the trend over time
was also positive. The interrupted time series model
showed that the short-term effect (change in level sub-
sidies β2) was significant, with utilisation increasing
from 43 consultations/1000 population to 51 consultations/
1000 population (P <0.01). Although the relative increase
in utilisation rose by 28% at 24 months, the change in
slope subsidies β3 (long-term effect) was not significant
even at the P <0.2 level.
Relative percentage changes in utilisation rates for health
zones
Figure 3 shows the relative percentage changes in utilisa-
tion rates between modelled outcomes and counterfactual
outcomes at one and 24 months for each health zone
(although the majority of changes were not significant as
indicated by Tables 2, 3 and 4). At one month, relative
changes in health-care utilisation rates ranged from −9 to
53% (median change 19%, interquartile range 11- 43%),
and a positive effect was observed in all but two (12.5%) of
the zones. Amongst zones with a positive effect at one
month, the relative change in health-care utilisation rates
at 24 months ranged from −55 – 138% (median change
4%, interquartile range 10 - 33%). Initial positive effects at
one month were sustained or increased in five health
zones at 24 months (zones above the bisector line) but
diminished over time in the remainder.
Discussion
This study is one of the few to quantify both the short- and
long-term effects of user fee subsidisation on health-care
utilisation on a large-scale, and in a fragile and conflict-
affected state [6,7,26,27]. Improved coverage and therefore
uptake of health-care is important as it is has been shown
to be linked to improvements in health outcomes [28].
Our research brings mixed findings on the effectiveness
of the user fee subsidisation as a strategy to increase the
utilisation of services. On one hand, it shows that subsi-
dising or removing user fees can result in an increase in
health-care utilisation in the short-term, a finding which is
consistent with other studies [6,7,29,30]. However, on the
other hand, it also seems that the user fee subsidisation
Figure 1 Trend of health-care utilisation rates before and after the introduction of user fee subsidisation for one health zone in the
DRC (2008 to 2012).
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Table 2 Regression outputs for zones using equations 1 and 2
Health
zone
Constant
(β0)
Secular
trend (β 1)
Change in
level salary
supplements (β2)
Change in
slope salary
supplements (β3)
Change in
level drugs (β2)
Change in slope
drugs (β3)
Change in level
subsidies (β2)
Change in slope
subsidies (β3)
Number of
observations
Adjusted R2 Durbin satson
statistic
Demba 52*** 0.054 N/A N/A N/A N/A 13*** 0.14 48 0.88 1.5*
(4.3) (−0.2) (−2.3) (−0.22)
Itombwe 26*** 0.32 N/A N/A N/A N/A 16*** 0.077 48 0.86 1.68
(−5.8) (−0.25) (−3.5) (−0.3)
Kailo 29** 0.79 N/A N/A N/A N/A 8.9 −0.36 48 0.76 1.35**
(−9.2) (−0.4) (−5.2) (−0.48)
Kabare 18 0.97 N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.4 −1 48 0.67 0.82***
(−14) (−0.56) (−5.9) (−0.78)
Kampene 22 0.89 N/A N/A N/A N/A −2.9 −0.84 48 0.06 1.21***
(−16) (−0.7) (−8.8) (−0.86)
Minembwe 27** 0.49 N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.4 0.22 48 0.78 1.56*
(−7.9) (−0.34) (−4.9) (−0.41)
Pangi 26*** 0.46* N/A N/A N/A N/A 23*** −0.38 48 0.87 2.14
(−5) (−0.22) (−3.1) (−0.25)
Kalehe 45* 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.2 −0.31 48 0.32 1.05***
(−17) (−0.72) (−8) (−0.94)
Ubundu 32 0.227 N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.09 0.586 57 0.82 0.73***
(−896) (−1.48) (−4.96) (−1.65)
Punia 21 2.4 −3.5 −1.6 1.3 0.45 18* 0.68 60 0.82 0.9***
(−16) (−5.7) (−8.7) (0.45) (−10) (−0.7) (−8.2) (0.9)
Ferekeni 25 5.7 −2.2 0.27 −12 −5.3 9.8 −0.31 60 0.78 1.23***
(−11) (−4.6) (−6.9) (−0.32) (−9) (−6) (−5.7) (−0.46)
Kalima 53 −1.9 1.1 10 17** −7.5 11** −0.31 60 0.93 1.33***
(−6.9) (−2.9) (−4.4) (−2.1) (−5.8) (−3.9) (−3.4) (−0.27)
Lubutu 49 −1.6 −11 −6.3 −4.5 7.3 18** 0.66 60 0.44 1.39***
(−12) (−5.3) (−8) (−3.7) (−11) (−7) (−6.3) (−0.48)
Obokote 38 −0.69 −2.2 3.1 7.9 −2 21.9*** 1** 60 0.56 1.92
(−13) (−5.9) (−8.2) (−3.9) (−13) (−7) (−5.2) (−0.36)
*P < 0.05. **P < 0.01. ***P < 0.001.
N.B. All Standard Errors are in parenthesis.
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did not generate the long-term positive effect one could
expect: in only one health zone, there was a significant
positive change in the trend of utilisation. In other health
zones, the change was most of the time negative but
always not significant. These findings suggested that the
studied user fee subsidisation sometimes generated some
quick wins (significant in 7/16 health zones), but without
triggering any positive loops developing their effect in the
months that followed.
In addition, there was some variation in the effects of
user fee subsidisation on health-care utilisation at one
month and 24 months between health zones. Although
the majority demonstrated a positive effect at one month,
two zones showed a negative effect. This is similar to the
findings reported from a study on the abolition of user
fees in Zambia and Niger [7], with the authors speculating
that negative effects could be explained by varying degrees
of enforcement of the new user fee policy; in some areas,
informal fees may have continued to be charged at health
facilities despite introduction of the policy.
The timing of salary supplements and free drug pro-
vision did not appear to modify the effect of user fee
subsidisation. This may be explained by the fact that these
health system strengthening measures alone are not
enough to sufficiently improve health-care utilisation; the
addition of user fee subsidisation may further increase
rates of health-care utilisation. Indeed, all zones were
receiving the full package of interventions by the time
user fee subsidisation was introduced, strengthening
the argument that all three measures should be in place
if significant improvements in health-care utilisation
are to be achieved.
One strength of our study is that it took into account
potential sources of bias, such as autocorrelation, which
often arise in the analysis of routine longitudinal data
[25], and used the methodology set out in a recent
Cochrane systematic review which concluded that more
rigorous research on the effects of user fees on health-care
utilisation was needed [6]. Secondly, the study covered a
large population over a five year period, thus increasing
Table 3 Regression output for health zones using equation 3
Health
zone
Constant
(β0)
Secular
trend (β1)
Change in level
salary supplements
and drugs (β2)
Change in slope
salary supplements
and drugs (β3)
Change
in level
subsidies (β2)
Change
in slope
subsidies (β3)
Number of
observations
Adjusted
R2
Durbin
watson
statistic
Bengamisa −1.3 2 −1.1 2 9.8 −3.5 58 0.87 0.82***
(−14) (−2) (−7.5) (−3.3) (−6.5) (−2.2)
Banalia 11 1.4 1.9 1.5 7 −2.4 58 0.89 1.15***
(−12) (−1.8) (−6.9) (−3) (−5.9) (−2)
***P < 0.001.
N.B. All Standard Errors are in parenthesis.
Figure 2 Effects of user fee subsidisation on mean health-care utilisation rate 12 months prior to and 24 months following their
introduction for 16 health zones of the DRC (2008 to 2012).
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the statistical power of the results. It is possible that data
reporting improved over the life of the programme as
health workers were trained over the course of the
programme in monitoring and evaluation. Yet, the steady
data completion rates over time suggest that this was not
a major factor. This study also attempted to control for
the confounding effect of salary supplements and drug
provision, albeit in only seven health zones.
There were a number of study limitations. Firstly,
although the population denominators that were used
were the best available, they were nonetheless unreliable
as they were extrapolated from a census conducted
almost 30 years ago. This is a limitation common to all
recent analyses of demographic information in the DRC.
The numerator data could also have been manipulated
by health zone staff; although there were regular spot
checks and audits as well as supervision by the NGOs to
ensure data recording was accurate, it is still possible
that some zones could have over-reported utilisation
figures. The extent to which this may have occurred
could not be quantified in this study. Secondly, data
disaggregated by age and sex were not available for our
study, and so the effect of user fees on different sub-
groups of the population could not be assessed. Such data
should be collected and analysed in any future user fee
subsidy programmes in the DRC. Thirdly, there was some
anecdotal evidence that people living in health zones
which were not included in the programme were seeking
care in health zones with user fee subsidisation, sometimes
travelling long distances to receive care. This spill-over
effect could not be quantified, and may have inflated our
results. However, it also provides evidence that user
fees act as a barrier to accessing services, if people are
compelled to travel considerable distances to avoid them.
In addition, factors which may have affected health-care
utilisation at different points over the five year period (e.g.
episodes of conflict or displacement, construction work,
and training funded by the programme) were not mea-
sured as part of this study. This was mitigated by the fact
that data on utilisation at least a year prior to and two
years after the implementation of user fee subsidisation
were available for all health zones allowing reliable trend
effects to be established. In the South Kivu health zones in
particular, episodes of conflict and displacement occurred
periodically between 2008 and 2012, which would have
been expected to lead to a concomitant decrease in utilisa-
tion rates. However, this was not observed in these health
zones. On the other hand, registration for the elections in
November 2011 which occurred in health facilities may
have driven an increase in utilisation rates in general
across health zones during this time.
A major gap in current health policy research is the
lack of studies on the impact of user fee subsidisation on
mortality and other health indicators. Unfortunately,
Table 4 Regression output for mean utilisation rate using equation 1
All 16 zones Constant (β0) Secular
trend (β1)
Change in
level (β2)
Change in
slope (β3)
Number of
observations
Adjusted R2 Durbin watson statistic
Overall mean utilisation rate 37** 0.436 7.43** 0.312 37 0.95 0.96***
(13.2) (0.63) (2.22) (0.787)
**P < 0.01. ***P < 0.001.
N.B. All Standard Errors are in parenthesis.
Figure 3 Percentage change in health-care utilisation rates between modelled and counterfactual outcomes, one month and 24 months
after introducing user fee subsidisation in the DRC (2008 to 2012).
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given the retrospective nature of our study, we were
unable to assess the impact of user fee subsidisation on
such indicators but further studies exploring this are
warranted. Finally, without performing a randomised
controlled trial, it is not possible to test the assumption
that the underlying trend in utilisation prior to the intro-
duction of the user fee policy would have continued in
the absence of the intervention.
While recognising that there are many facets and strat-
egies that need to be considered in terms of the DRC
achieving universal health coverage, this study illustrates
that the current levels of user fees in the DRC may present
a barrier to accessing health-care. It was beyond the scope
of this study to consider the issue of sustainability with
respect to user fee subsidisation. However, any reluctance
to subsidise user fees is largely due to the increased health
budget required. As such, for user fee subsidisation to be
implemented successfully there has to be long-term
commitment and investment by international donors and
national governments. Investing in a public health system
that is underused because of financial barriers is not an
optimal allocation of resources. Until financial barriers are
addressed, improvements in health system funding to
tackle essential elements such as provision of health-care
facilities, inadequate drug supplies and poor quality medi-
cations, poor training and motivation of health staff, short-
ages of health-care workers (all common in poor resource
settings), will continue to benefit only a limited number of
people. This is of utmost importance for donors and pol-
icy makers striving towards health impact. Furthermore,
the feasibility of alternative financing mechanisms should
also be explored and in this vein, DFID’s new Access to
Health-care programme aims to explore and evaluate the
effect of a system of community health insurance [31].
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study adds some evidence that subsi-
dising user fees may increase utilisation in the short-term,
and it is hoped that donors and government will embrace
these findings when deciding on health financing policy,
particularly as there is not yet a consensus view. Future
work however should focus on feasibility and sustainabil-
ity issues associated with the removal or reduction of user
fees and how to sustain its effects on utilisation in the
longer term [32].
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